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Abstract
The rotating discs argument (RDA) against perdurantism has been mostly
discussed by metaphysicians, though the argument of course appeals to ideas
from classical mechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the
RDA from the perspective of the philosophy of physics. I argue for three main
conclusions.
The first conclusion is that the RDA can be formulated more strongly than
is usually recognized: it is not necessary to ‘imagine away’ the dynamical effects
of rotation. The second is that in general relativity, the RDA fails because of
frame-dragging.
The third conclusion is that even setting aside general relativity, the strong
formulation of the RDA can after all be defeated. Namely, by the perdurantist
taking objects in classical mechanics (whether point-particles or continuous bod-
ies) to have only temporally extended, i.e. non-instantaneous, temporal parts:
which immediately blocks the RDA. Admittedly, this version of perdurantism
defines persistence in a weaker sense of ‘definition’ than pointilliste versions that
aim to define persistence assuming only instantaneous temporal parts. But I
argue that temporally extended temporal parts: (i) can do the jobs within the
endurantism-perdurantism debate that the perdurantist wants temporal parts to
do; and (ii) are supported by both classical and quantum mechanics.
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1 Introduction
This paper is an attempt to connect what modern physics says about matter, with
the debate in analytic metaphysics about whether an object persists over time by the
selfsame object existing at different times (nowadays called ‘endurance’), or by different
temporal parts, or stages, existing at different times (called ‘perdurance’). Though this
is a multi-faceted debate, with various connections to the philosophy of physics, I will
focus on just one connection: a metaphysical argument against perdurantism, based on
the idea of rotating homogeneous matter, and nowadays often called the ‘rotating discs
argument’ (RDA). I will argue, against much of the literature, that the argument fails,
because of some features of classical mechanics (including how it should be interpreted
in the light of quantum mechanics).
I begin by reporting the RDA and some of the literature’s discussion of it (Section
2). Then I propose an improved version of the argument; but point out that even
this version fails in general relativity (Section 3). In the last two Sections, I set aside
general relativity and propose a new perdurantist line of reply to the argument (even
my improved version of it). The idea is that the perdurantist should accept only
non-instantaneous temporal parts. This idea can be supported both by considerations
drawn from classical mechanics (Section 4), and by considerations drawn from quantum
mechanics (Section 5).
This paper is part of a larger project. My ([2005], [2004a]) describe some other
connections between the endurantism-perdurantism debate and aspects of physics and
its philosophy. Suffice it to say here that I conceive the debate in much the same
terms as Sider’s and Hawley’s fine recent monographs ([2001]); (they discuss the RDA,
at pp. 72-90, and 224-36, respectively). My ([2004b]) also expands on the following
treatment of the RDA: it gives more detail about the RDA, the interpretative subtleties
of classical mechanics, and the physics of rotation; and it assesses some other replies
to the RDA, especially those by Callender, Lewis, Robinson and Sider.
2 The story so far
2.1 The RDA
The argument envisages that the perdurantist with her ontology of temporal parts faces
the project of defining persistence: since persistence is not identity, she needs to tell us
what it is. (This project is also called ‘analyzing persistence’, and ‘analyzing or defining
the genidentity relation between temporal parts’.) In particular, she needs to define
persistence so as to distinguish ordinary persisting objects (i.e. the referents of ordinary
terms, and elements of ordinary domains of quantification) from the countless other
‘spacetime worms’, i.e. mereological fusions of temporal parts. (Most perdurantists
accept unrestricted mereological composition, so that they also accept these worms as
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genuine objects.) On pain of circularity, the definiens is not to presuppose the notion
of persistence.
The argument urges that the perdurantist cannot succeed in this project.1 It is
based on two ideas:
(i) Homogeneous: In a continuum (i.e. a continuous body whose composing matter
entirely fills its volume) that is utterly homogeneous throughout a time-interval con-
taining two times t0, t1, a spatial part at the time t0 is equally qualitatively similar to
any spatial part congruent to itself (i.e. of the same size and shape) at the later time
t1. (The properties of the continuum can change over time, but must not vary over
space, even on arbitrarily small length scales; e.g. the continuum could cool down, but
must at each time have the same temperature everywhere.)
(ii) Follow: The perdurantist will presumably try to define persistence in terms of
suitable relations of qualitative similarity between temporal parts. The obvious tactic
is to have the definiens ‘follow’ the curves in spacetime that are timelike and track
maximum qualitative similarity.
The tactic of Follow seems to work well when applied to point-particles moving in
a void each with a continuous spacetime trajectory (worldline). For however exactly
we define ‘maximum qualitative similarity’, there will no doubt be, starting at a point-
particle at t0, a unique timelike curve of qualitative similarity (or occupation-by-matter)
passing through it: the worldline of the particle. Similarly for point-particles moving,
not in a void, but in a continuous fluid with suitably different properties—a different
‘colour’, or made of different ‘stuff’, than the point-particle.2
But Homogeneous implies that Follow’s strategy stumbles when applied to an ut-
terly homogeneous continuum. There are altogether too many spatial parts at t1 that
are tied-first-equal as regards qualitative similarity to the given spatial part at t0: any
congruent spatial part will do. In other words: the curves of qualitative similarity run
‘every which way’.
This problem is made vivid by urging that the perdurantist cannot distinguish two
possibilities that, the argument alleges, must be distinguished. One main example,
on which I will focus, is the case of a rigid disc made of homogeneous matter that is
stationary; and a duplicate disc (rigid and congruent to, made of the same homogeneous
material as, at the same temperature as etc. the first) that is rotating about the axis
through its centre. It will be convenient to have labels for two such possibilities: call
them ‘(Stat)’ and ‘(Rot)’.
Hence the argument is nowadays often called the ‘rotating discs argument’ (RDA).
(In some discussions, both discs are rotating, but with different velocities, maybe even
1The RDA arose in recent philosophy in Kripke (unpublished lectures) and Armstrong ([1980]).
Zimmerman ([1998]) reports how the argument goes back at least to Broad in 1925. Sider ([2001], p.
226) notes that Leibniz ([1698], sect. 13) deploys essentially the same argument: but Leibniz’s target
is Descartes’ doctrines about matter and motion.
2Agreed, one can object to this tactic. I address these objections in Sections 4.1-4.2.1 of my
([2004a]). But the details of my replies are not needed for this paper: for they are no help to the
perdurantist in facing the trouble made by the RDA.
4
in different senses.) But all agree that countless other examples would serve just as well
as a disc: e.g. a sphere; or a body of fluid, like a river, that can be either stationary
or flowing (or flowing with different speeds, or in different directions).
It seems that the endurantist can easily distinguish the two possibilities, according
to whether the very same non-circularly-symmetric part, e.g. a segment, is in the same
place at two times. My ([2004b], Section 3.3) pursues the question whether this is
really so: can the endurantist legitimately use the notion of being in the same place at
two times, i.e. the notion of persisting spatial points? (This question is almost entirely
ignored in the metaphysical literature: authors often appeal without further discussion
to the idea of ‘the same place’ (e.g. Hawley [2001], p. 85).) Here I just assume, in
order to give the RDA as good a run as possible, that the answer is Yes; though I will
say more in Section 3 about what this notion involves.
On the other hand, it seems the perdurantist has a problem. Surely she must say
that all the relations (and therefore, all her proffered ‘suitable relations’ for analysing
persistence) between two temporal parts of the disc (say, second-long parts at noon and
12.01) are the same—whether the disc is rotating or not? And similarly for temporal
parts at the two times of any spatial part of the disc, such as a segment.
The rest of this Section clarifies the scope of this argument, and the kinds of reply
the perdurantist can give to it. This will yield a statement of a consensus which is
widespread in the literature—and an announcement of how the remainder of the paper
will argue against that consensus.
2.2 Intrinsic properties and the idea of velocity
So far I have expressed the RDA’s main idea as the inadequacy, for defining persistence,
of qualitative similarity. But in some versions of the argument, the emphasis is instead
on the inadequacy of either intrinsic properties or the idea of velocity. Both these
topics call for some comments.
2.2.1 The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction
The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction among properties is controversial, but the rough
idea is that possession of an intrinsic property implies nothing about the possessor’s
environment, i.e. about matters of fact beyond the instance. So in some versions of
the RDA, the target is a perdurantist who seeks a definiens using intrinsic properties
of temporal parts. And in some versions, the target is a yet stronger neo-Humean
doctrine to the effect that (roughly speaking) all facts—not just facts of persistence—
are determined by all the various intrinsic properties of all the points of spacetime.
The most influential version of this sort of extreme ‘pointilliste’ doctrine is Humean
supervenience, as formulated and defended by Lewis ([1986], p. ix-x; [1994], p. 474;
[1999]).
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Fortunately, I will not need to take sides in the ongoing controversy about how to
analyse, indeed understand, the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction. (For an introduction, cf.
Weatherson ([2002], especially Section 3.1), and the symposium, e.g. Lewis ([2001]),
that he cites.) Indeed until Section 4, the distinction will drop out of sight. But I can
announce here that even then, my discussion will be based on a much clearer distinction,
between what Lewis ([1983], p. 114) dubbed the ‘positive extrinsic’ properties, and the
rest. This goes as follows.
Lewis was criticizing Kim’s proposal, to analyze extrinsic properties as those that
imply accompaniment, where something is accompanied iff it coexists with some wholly
distinct contingent object, and so to analyze intrinsic (i.e. not extrinsic) properties as
those that are compatible with being unaccompanied, i.e. being the only contingent
object in the universe (for short: being lonely). Lewis objected that loneliness is it-
self obviously extrinsic. He also argued that there was little hope of amending Kim’s
analysis. In particular, you might suggest that to be extrinsic, a property must either
imply accompaniment or imply loneliness: so Lewis dubs these disjuncts ‘positive ex-
trinsic’ and ‘negative extrinsic’ respectively. But Lewis points out that by disjoining
and conjoining properties, we can find countless extrinsic properties that are neither
positive extrinsic nor negative extrinsic; (though ‘almost any extrinsic property that a
sensible person would ever mention is positive extrinsic’ ([1983], p. 115)).
This critique of Kim served as a springboard, both for Lewis’ own analysis, using
a primitive notion of naturalness which did other important work in his metaphysics
(Lewis [1983a]), and for other, metaphysically less committed, analyses (e.g. Langton
and Lewis [1998], Lewis [2001]).
But I will not need to pursue these details. I can make do with the notion of pos-
itive extrinsicality, i.e. implying accompaniment, and its negation. But in Section 4 I
will make some novel proposals about the notion: namely, I will distinguish temporal
and spatial extrinsicality, and propose degrees of extrinsicality.
2.2.2 Velocity to the rescue?
On first meeting the RDA, most people make the obvious suggestion that what dis-
tinguishes the two cases is the direction of the instantaneous velocity of the disc’s (or
sphere’s, or river’s) constituent parts. Thus for the stationary disc, all the disc’s parts
have zero velocity; while for the rotating disc, the parts have various velocities (and
for a perfectly rigid disc, a common angular velocity); and similarly for the sphere or
river.
But there is a consensus in the RDA literature against this tactic. The consensus
urges that the notion of velocity presupposes the persistence of the object concerned.
For average velocity is a quotient of distance and time, whose numerator must be
the distance traversed by the given persisting object: otherwise you could give me
a superluminal velocity by dividing the distance between me and the Sun by a time
less than eight minutes. (This goes with the so-called Russellian theory of motion,
also called the ‘at-at theory of motion’.) So average velocity’s limit, instantaneous
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velocity, surely also presupposes the notion of persistence. Accordingly, says the RDA,
the perdurantist cannot adopt the obvious suggestion, of distinguishing the cases in
terms of instantaneous velocity (or angular velocity)—on pain of circularity. Many
authors make this point, in some cases combining it with the idea that velocity is not
an intrinsic property of an object at a time, or of a temporal part; for example, cf.
Shoemaker ([1979], p.327), Zimmerman ([1998], p. 268), Sider ([2001], p. 34) and
Hawley ([2001], p. 77-79).
This consensus prompts three comments, in ascending order of importance for the
rest of the paper. First, I should note that various authors have sketched a rival,
heterodox account of velocity, based on the idea that velocity should be an intrinsic
property of an object at a time; for example, Tooley ([1988], p. 236f.), Bigelow and
Pargetter ([1989], especially pp. 290-94; [1990], pp. 62-82) and Arntzenius ([2000]: pp.
189, 197-201).3 For simplicity, I will speak of ‘Tooleyan velocities’.
But the consensus seems unmoved by such Tooleyan velocities. For even if a Too-
leyan velocity is an intrinsic property of the object, this concept of velocity involves the
notion of persistence no less than does the orthodox Russellian concept. This point is
made by Zimmerman ([1998], p. 282-84) and Hawley ([2001], p. 79).
I think a reply can be made to this consensus ([2004b]: Section 4.2). But in this
paper, I will set aside Tooleyan velocities. I am no friend of them. For I think their
main motivation is to secure a pointilliste interpretation of mechanics (as these authors
say or hint: e.g. Arntzenius ([2000], p. 200)). And as will emerge (especially in Section
4.5), I think there are good reasons against such pointillisme.
Second and more generally, I will in this paper endorse the consensus. That is, I
will concede that both average and instantaneous velocity presuppose the notion of
persistence, and are extrinsic properties. (Indeed, they are positive extrinsic in the
sense of Section 2.2.1, since they entail the existence at other times of a temporal part
of the object.) But I shall nevertheless argue in Section 4 that a certain kind of per-
durantist can endorse the obvious suggestion we began with: that is, the perdurantist
can appeal to velocities to distinguish the two cases.
Third, I need to emphasise that the orthodox concept of velocity is much subtler
(because connected to other concepts in complicated ways) than the above discussion
suggests. Even if we consider only classical physics, it is not true that velocity is ‘just’
the quotient of distance traversed and time elapsed, or its limit dx/dt. Similarly, mo-
mentum is not just mass times velocity, m dx/dt. Agreed, the philosophical literature,
in particular about the RDA, tends to assume the opposite—that velocity is just the
time-derivative of position etc. Besides, until Section 4.2.3 my own argument can go
along with this assumption. But it is wrong; (and Section 4.2.3 will show the point’s
significance).
For firstly, there are rigorous formulations of classical mechanics (both for point-
particles and continua) in which position is not thus privileged. Thus Hamiltonian
3The first and last are not concerned with the debate over persistence. The proposals also seem to
be mutually independent: the later authors do not cite the previous work.
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formulations take momentum as primitive, together with position and mass, and de-
fine velocity as momentum divided by mass. (And in such formulations, momentum
does not need to be ‘secretly understood’ as mass times velocity: one can introduce it
abstractly, and without reference to time, as the generator of spatial translations.)
Secondly, this point is strengthened when one goes beyond classical mechanics to
consider the rest of classical physics. Space forbids a full discussion of this. But
I maintain that classical mechanics, especially of continua, does not have a neat or
‘closed’ ontology. More precisely: interpreting classical mechanics leads inevitably to
thermodynamics, optics and the rest of classical physics, and thereby eventually to
the paradoxes (such as the failure of the equipartition theorem, and the ultraviolet
catastrophe) that ushered in quantum theory. This means that classical mechanics,
and the rest of classical physics, turns out to be a house built on sand. We know now
that it is quantum sand—and that it somehow keeps the house up. But it remains
darned mysterious how it does so. By this I do not just mean that the interpretation
of quantum theory (especially its measurement problem) remains mysterious. Also,
some aspects of how ‘the house manages to stay up’ are current research projects in
theoretical, not foundational, physics. One obvious example is the physics of decoher-
ence (which I will return to in Section 5.2); another example, closely related to the the
ultraviolet catastrophe, is the stability of matter.
This is not the place to pursue such examples; (my ([2004b], Section 2) gives some
more details). The relevant point here is just that since classical physical theories are
eventually embroiled in paradox, there is so far no reason to think that classical physics’
(or even classical mechanics’) best formulation (i.e. the formulation that achieves
the best combination of the conflicting virtues of rigour and completeness/coverage)
will privilege position, in the sense that velocity is always defined as ‘just’ the time-
derivative of position.
To take an example: the speedometer of a plane measures velocity ‘directly’, i.e. not
as the time-derivative of position, viz. by measuring the pressure of the apparent head-
wind, i.e. the oncoming air. Agreed, you could try to rigorously describe the physics of
this instrument in a way that privileged position, in that velocity, though apparently
measured ‘directly’, was nevertheless defined as the time-derivative of position—indeed,
for all the various objects involved, as well as the plane as a whole. And initially at
least, you could certainly make progress in this attempt. You could describe the de-
tails of the instrument’s interaction with the air, describing the air either with the
kinetic theory of gases, or with a continuum model: both kinds of model could privi-
lege position in this sense. (In particular, continuum models can be given a Lagrangian
formulation, which thus privileges position.) So I agree that maybe, for this example, a
coherent classical description can indeed be given that both privileges position as basic
and is in some strong sense complete. But the general point remains: the variety and
incipient paradox of classical physics mean there is no reason to think that in its best
formulation, velocity will always ‘boil down to’ the time-derivative of position.
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2.3 ‘Naturalism’
So far, my description of the perdurantist project of defining persistence, and of the
RDA against it, might well be read within the tradition of conceptual analysis. By this
I mean that the perdurantist’s definition would be both finite in length, and formulated
using everyday concepts. But nowadays, the literature also considers a ‘naturalized’
perdurantist project of
(a): providing only a supervenience basis for persistence (i.e. allowing infinitely
long definitions), rather than a finite definition or analysis of it; and-or
(b): appealing to technical notions, and contingent bodies of doctrine, in partic-
ular the laws of dynamics. (Some authors combine (b) with use of the Ramsey-Lewis
technique for simultaneous functional definition; e.g. Sider ([2001], 230-36).)
Accordingly, the RDA is nowadays sometimes formulated as targeting even: (a) the
supervenience of persistence on qualitative similarity among, and-or intrinsic proper-
ties of, the perdurantist’s temporal parts; where (b) such supervenience may even be
contingent, say relative to the laws of a dynamical theory.
This situation prompts two comments: the first relates mostly to (a), the second
mostly to (b).
(1): Non-reductive perdurantism:— There is also an even more naturalistic con-
ception of perdurantism, which might well avoid the RDA. On this conception, the
perdurantist seeks a theory of perdurance and related concepts, that can appeal to
scientific technicalities, that can revise rather than describe our concepts—and that
does not have to define persistence in terms that do not presuppose it. Of course,
analogous ‘non-reductive’ conceptions are nowadays commonplace in the philosophi-
cal study of many concepts, such as causation, perception and action. So just as a
philosophical theory of causation might decline to define causation (even infinitarily,
even by Ramsey-Lewis functional definition), a perdurantist might decline to define
persistence (even in these liberalized senses), on the grounds that she nevertheless says
enough to adequately distinguish ordinary persisting objects from other ‘spacetime
worms’. I shall return to this modest (because non-reductive) perdurantism in Section
4. But until then I shall consider the more ambitious perdurantist, who aspires to
define persistence, and so faces the RDA.
(2): How many worlds?:— Once we allow that a perdurantist theory of persistence
might appeal to a contingent body of doctrine, such as a physical theory, the discussion
of the RDA (or even the whole endurantism-perdurantism debate) is liable to become
relative to a theory. There are two aspects to this; the first leads on to the second.
First: the RDA might hold good in one theory, and fail in another. Thus it is a
familiar thought that any consistent theory lays out a set of possibilities: in philo-
sophical jargon, possible worlds according to the theory; in physics jargon, a space of
solutions. So relative to any consistent theory about matter and rotation (describing
them no doubt partially rather than completely—and perhaps falsely), the two cases
(Stat) and (Rot) are either two distinct possibilities: or they are not, either because
at least one is not possible (since e.g. the theory denies that matter is homogeneous),
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or because they are the same possibility.
This point is independent of scientific realism, which concerns whether we should
believe the theoretical claims of our best theory to be at least approximately true. But
of course, any ‘naturalist’ will be especially interested in whether the RDA holds good
in our best theory of matter and rotation.
Second: But we should beware of just dismissing the RDA on the ground that
according to our best theories, matter is in fact made of atoms and so not homogeneous.
For presumably:
(i): A continuous, rigid and utterly homogeneous form of matter could exist and
be formed into a disc that either rotates or is stationary. And:
(ii): No philosopher of persistence is ‘so far gone’ in naturalism as to be interested
only in how objects persist, given all the contingencies of the actual world.
In what follows, I will agree with these presumptions, so as to give the RDA against
perdurantism as good a run as possible. But it is worth drawing attention to them
since, as we shall see:
(i’): The sort of continuous and homogeneous matter the RDA needs is a much
subtler and more problematic affair than the RDA literature typically recognizes. This
leads in to (ii’):—
(ii’): Some perdurantists reply to the RDA by saying that for the possibilities (Stat)
and (Rot) to exhibit no difference to which the perdurantist can appeal, the advocate
of the RDA needs to ‘imagine away’ so many actual laws, technical and-or everyday,
which describe various causes and effects of rotation, that the RDA’s possibilities (Stat)
and (Rot) are, though logically or metaphysically possible, very arcane. Indeed, they
are so arcane that a naturalist perdurantist need feel no shame in being unable to
accommodate them.
To put the reply (ii’) in the jargon of possible worlds: the perdurantist claims their
theory of persistence, though contingent and unable to discriminate the possibilities
(Stat) and (Rot), is true in so broad a class of possible worlds that excluding (at least
one of) (Stat) and (Rot) is a small price—and worth paying. (Examples of this reply
include: Lewis ([1986], p.xiii, [1994], p. 475), Callender ([2001]), and (less explicitly)
Sider ([2001], 230-36).) This leads to the next Subsection.
2.4 The accompaniments of rotation
Rotation has countless typical causes and effects; or if one is wary of causal talk:
countless typical accompaniments. Typically, a rotating object was previously set in
motion, say by being pushed by someone, and exhibits distinctive dynamical effects: for
example, a solid object tends to become oblate, and a fluid, like water in a whirlpool,
develops a concave surface. These accompaniments do not depend on matter being
in fact atomistic (or on the laws of physics being relativistic and quantum). So in a
possible world that contained continuous and homogeneous matter but was otherwise
‘like the actual world’, these accompaniments—even the ‘technical’ ones, like oblateness
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and concavity—would occur. In which case, the RDA needs to block the perdurantist
appealing to them so as to distinguish the cases.
True to the tradition of conceptual analysis, the literature on the RDA almost
entirely sets aside the technical accompaniments, and concentrates on the everyday
ones, like having been pushed in the past; and on related everyday counterfactuals,
such as ‘were I to spray a spot of paint on the disc, I would see it move’, or ‘were
I to grasp the disc, I would feel friction’. More specifically, the literature tends to
assume that the RDA can legitimately set aside all the technical accompaniments by
just stipulating that the rotating disc is not only solid but perfectly rigid, so that it
does not become oblate; (hence Section 2.1’s mention of rigidity). The philosophical
battle can then be joined on two battlefields familiar to metaphysicians; as follows.
First, there is debate about whether the RDA can legitimately ‘imagine away’ the
everyday accompaniments of rotation, so that the perdurantist cannot appeal to them.
In particular: if (as usual) the RDA stipulates that the present and ‘occurrent’ everyday
accompaniments are absent, can the perdurantist appeal to past or future accompani-
ments, or perhaps to counterfactuals about them? For example:
(i) Can the perdurantist make the distinction by appealing to a past cause, such as
a push, or to a present counterfactual about seeing a paint-spot move?
(ii) Or would appealing to a past cause amount to postulating an unacceptable
‘temporal action-at-a-distance’ (e.g. Robinson [1989] p. 405-6; Hawley [2001] p. 81)?
(iii) And would appealing to a present counterfactual amount to postulating unac-
ceptably ‘ungrounded’ counterfactual truths (Robinson [1989] p. 403; Hawley [2001]
p. 74-5)?
Second, there is debate about whether the perdurantist can appeal to differences
between (Stat) and (Rot) that are distinctively metaphysical (neither everyday nor
technical-physical). For example: Can the perdurantist appeal to:
(i) a special (non-Humean) relation of immanent causation between temporal parts
that subvenes (or even yields an analysis of) persistence (Armstrong [1980], [1997], pp.
73-4); or
(ii) special vectorial properties that are numerically equal to, yet different from,
velocities (Robinson [1989] pp. 406-8, Lewis [1999]: incidentally, this idea echoes
Leibniz’s proposal against Descartes ([1698], sect. 13)); or
(iii) non-causal relations between temporal parts that are not supervenient on the
intrinsic natures of the parts that are the relata, and yet are not just spatiotemporal
relations (Hawley: [1999], p. 63-6; [2001], p. 85-90)?
I do not need to enter either of these battlefields; (fortunately, since they remain
well-populated, despite the crossfire!). As to the first, I can set aside the ‘everyday
accompaniments’. For I shall argue in Section 3 that the RDA should not just set aside
technicalities, in particular the technical accompaniments of rotation; and that in any
case, it cannot do so just by stipulating perfect rigidity. As to the second, I can set aside
controversial notions such as immanent causation and special vectorial properties; (of
which I am in any case wary: [2004b], Section 4.1, 4.3). For I shall argue in Sections 4
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and 5 that technicalities from physics suggest another way the perdurantist can reply
to the RDA.
2.5 Two kinds of reply: Against the consensus
We can sum up ‘the story so far’ in two stages. First, there are two main ways
perdurantists can reply (and have replied) to the RDA. They can either:
(‘Appealing Differences’): argue that there are differences between the discs to
which they can appeal; whether everyday (e.g. ‘someone pushed it’), technical (e.g.
‘it’s oblate’) or metaphysical (e.g. ‘the timelike curves of immanent causation are
helical, not straight’); or
(‘No Difference’): argue that possible worlds in which the discs show no such
difference are too arcane to matter: i.e. they do not fall within the scope of their
‘naturalist’ account of persistence.
Of course, these replies can in a sense be combined. For in the back-and-forth of
debate, a perdurantist might move from one reply to the other: ‘well, if you imagine
away all of those accompaniments of rotation, I will then reply that there is after all
no difference’.
Second: In the literature on the RDA, considerations of metaphysics, and in par-
ticular conceptual analysis, tend to dominate. This dominance has led to a widespread
consensus on four points: two in support of the RDA, and two against the perdurantist.
Namely:
(I): The RDA can legitimately
(a) imagine away the usual accompaniments of rotation: both the everyday
ones; and the technical ones such as discs tending to be become oblate (in the latter
case, by requiring the discs to be rigid);
(b) assume the intuitive notion of rotation, with its idea of persisting spatial
points.
On the other hand:
(II): the perdurantist cannot legitimately
(c) appeal to differences of velocity, since velocity presupposes persistence; nor
can they
(d) appeal to the atomic, indeed quantum-theoretic, nature of matter, since the
topic of debate is our common-sense conception of persistence—which surely allows
continuous matter.
Turning to this paper: I shall now argue against the consensus (a)-(d). Section 3
argues against (a) and (b); Sections 4 and 5 against (c) and (d). The overall effect
will be twofold. As to (a) and (b): I will concede that there are sound versions of
the RDA. Indeed, the RDA can be formulated more strongly than in Section 2.1:
for it need not imagine away the usual accompaniments of rotation. But as to (c)
and (d): a certain sort of perdurantist—roughly speaking, one who accepts only non-
instantaneous temporal parts—can both appeal to differences of velocity, and garner
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support for their position from quantum theory.
3 Describing rotation
The main topic of this Section is the practice by the RDA’s advocates, of imagin-
ing away the technical accompaniments of rotation (especially dynamical effects, like
oblateness) that the perdurantist might latch on to as marking the distinction between
the discs, (Stat) and (Rot). I will argue that:
(i): One main aspect of physics’ description of rotation supports this practice (Sec-
tion 3.1).
(ii): But the RDA’s advocates are lucky—it is an undeserved victory—since they
are largely unaware of (i); and their actual reasons for imagining away such accompa-
niments are worse (Section 3.2).
(iii): In any case, the RDA can be formulated more strongly, i.e. without imagining
away such accompaniments. The idea is that the perdurantist cannot distinguish two
possibilities that differ about the sense of a disc’s rotation; (Section 3.3).
(iv): Both the original version of the RDA and this stronger version fail in general
relativity (Section 3.4).
3.1 Rotation is kinematic
The description of motion and in particular of rotation, in the various spacetime theo-
ries (non-relativistic and relativistic, special and general), is a large and subtle subject.
In particular, general relativity holds considerable surprises (Malament [2002], [2003]).
But in this Subsection, I only need the following points:
(i): The various theories analyse motion using a four-dimensional connection (not
necessarily supplied by an absolute space), and spatial and temporal metrical struc-
ture; and they model continuous matter with a congruence of timelike curves: i.e. a
continuously infinite collection of worldlines whose points of intersection with a (pos-
sibly finite) spacelike slice completely fill the slice.
(ii): Given such a connection, metric(s) and congruence, the theories define (in
much the same way) at each point in the congruence a rotation tensor, usually sym-
bolized as ω, which gives a quantitative measure of the speed and direction of rotation
of the congruence in an arbitrarily small neighbourhood of that point.
(iii): This construction is a ‘robust local’ limit of definitions of rotation for ex-
tended objects; in the following sense. There are various intuitively compelling (and
experimentally realizable) criteria for whether an extended object, such as a disc, is
rotating; but as one considers smaller and smaller discs, the verdicts of these various
criteria as to whether a given disc is rotating converge on the verdict given by the
rotation tensor, i.e. by whether or not ω = 0. (The surprises about rotation in general
relativity (Malament ibid.) concern extended objects. For more details about (i)-(iii),
cf. e.g. Misner et al. [1973], p. 566; Dixon [1978], p. 121-8, 140-5, 163-6; Wald [1984],
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p. 216-8.)
There is also a large and subtle philosophical subject hereabouts: can the per-
durantist and endurantist equally well accommodate the contents of these spacetime
theories, or does one have an advantage over the other? Thus the rise of relativity
theory prompted philosophers such as Russell and Whitehead to claim that relativity
theory favoured an ontology of events, not substances—corresponding, at least roughly,
to today’s perdurantist ontology. But on the other hand: nowadays, many enduran-
tists are ‘scientific realists’, and even ‘substantivalists’ about spacetime so that they
advocate a mixed ontology: though matter endures, spacetime regions are also genuine
objects and they perdure. For the sake of brevity, I must set aside this debate: (for
some discussion and references, for both sides of this debate, cf. Sider ([2001], pp.
75-6, 110-9) and my ([2004b]: Section 5.4)). As mentioned at the end of Section 2.1, I
will just assume, so as to give the RDA as good a run as possible, that the endurantist
has at least as much right as the perdurantist to these theories.
Points (i)-(iii) imply that ω is definable in kinematic terms, without regard to
dynamics: rotation makes sense without reference to forces, energies etc. I claim this
supports the RDA’s tradition of imagining away rotation’s usual accompaniments. To
put it in terms of possible worlds: (i)-(iii) suggest there are possible worlds with a
spacetime manifold, spatial and temporal metrics and compatible connection, and a
congruence of timelike curves representing continuous matter—and no dynamics. A
pair of these worlds can match in countless ways and yet differ as to whether the matter
is rotating at a point in spacetime. For we can imagine that the worlds match so well
as to justify talking of a point common to the two spacetimes, and yet in one world
the rotation tensor is zero at the point, while in the other it is non-zero. I take this
as evidence that perdurantism should strive to accommodate the distinction between
these possibilities.4
3.2 Beware of rigidity
But advocates of the RDA have usually had different—and I submit, worse—reasons
than that just given, for insisting that the perdurantist should distinguish (Stat) and
(Rot) even without any of the usual accompaniments of rotation. I will not try to
catalogue people’s errors, but will focus on one prevalent reason: that the RDA can
just stipulate that the discs are perfectly rigid. (Parts of this Subsection’s critique will
carry over to versions of the RDA that use a homogeneous fluid, rather than a rigid
solid.)
4I do not claim that it is conclusive evidence. Some perdurantists will still prefer the ‘No Difference’
reply to the RDA. That is: they will say that worlds with no dynamics are so unlike the actual world,
that perdurantists have no responsibility to distinguish rotation and non-rotation within them (cf.
Callender [2001], p. 38). But I do not need to resolve this dispute between myself and fellow-
perdurantists. For all perdurantists can agree to the more important conclusions in the next three
Subsections.
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This reason is defective in two ways. First: to say these two words ‘perfectly rigid’,
so ‘trippingly off the tongue’, is to forget that within the theories of classical continuum
physics, perfect rigidity is a very strong idealization—it violates central principles of
these theories.
To take the example of a disc: what in fact would happen when a (classical, con-
tinuous, homogeneous) stationary disc is pushed at its edge to make it rotate, is very
complicated. A disturbance would travel outward (at the speed of sound for the disc’s
material) from the place where the push is applied, leading to a complex process that
settled down so that the whole disc rotated approximately uniformly, with internal
cohesive forces exerting the required centripetal forces on parts of the disc.5 So assum-
ing perfect rigidity requires that the disc’s cohesive forces should respond ‘infinitely
quickly’ to distorting influences. More precisely, it amounts to vetoing any account of
how the whole disc is set in motion as a consequence of the motions of the parts. In
physics jargon: it vetoes any constitutive theory.6
Second: it is not true that perfect rigidity gets rid of all the actual technical accom-
paniments of rotation. For not all such accompaniments are kinematically manifested,
i.e. associated with changes in shape or size. In particular, dynamical effects involv-
ing forces and energies would be present in a perfectly rigid rotating disc. (In physics
jargon: some effects involve stress rather than strain.) There will be cohesive forces
throughout the disc’s interior which would be absent if the disc were stationary; and
the disc’s energy is greater (which in relativity means that its mass is greater). Though
such effects are more technical than being oblate, that is no reason to think the per-
durantist cannot appeal to them.7
3.3 An improved RDA: allowing the actual accompaniments
The previous Subsection prompts the suspicion that the RDA needs to imagine away all
the actual accompaniments of rotation, in something like the way suggested in Section
3.1. But in fact, not so! Just by altering appropriately the possibilities considered, we
can get a formulation of the RDA which keeps all the actual accompaniments.8 Thus
5In the actual quantum world, this description is of course an excellent approximation for solid
discs, the cohesive forces being electromagnetic forces between atoms.
6Two incidental remarks about rigidity. (1): There is also the worry that perfect rigidity violates
relativity’s prohibition on faster-than-light signals. But in fact, relativistic theories allow generalized
notions of rigidity: for a philosopher’s introduction, cf. Earman ([1989], Chapter 5.5, pp. 98-101).
(2): Among Bigelow and Pargetter’s arguments for their heterodox account of instantaneous velocity,
as not always a limit of average velocities, is a thought-experiment involving perfectly rigid spheres
([1989], pp. 292-3, [1990], pp. 67-8). As it happens, I disagree with their argument, but I will not go
into details: in Section 2.2.2, I already set aside such heterodox accounts of velocity.
7At least: it is only a reason if we take the endurantism-perdurantism debate as entirely a matter
of analyzing everyday concepts. In particular, the RDA cannot just consider an oblate rotating disc
and a non-rotating one moulded so as to be congruent to it (as proposed by Hawley [2001], p. 83-4).
8Paul Mainwood and David Wallace devised the following formulation in a seminar in autumn
2003. The idea of exploiting the distinction between two senses of rotation, so as to avoid having to
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the endurantist challenges the perdurantist to distinguish the possibilities:—
(Same): Two perfectly circular discs, d1 and d2, both made of continuous homoge-
neous matter and lying in the same spatial plane—but otherwise as different as you
please from one another—spin in the same sense (i.e. both clockwise as seen from one
side of the plane, and so anti-clockwise as seen from the other side).
(Different): Two discs, d′1 and d
′
2, match d1 and d2 respectively in all respects (at
all times); except that d′1 and d
′
2 spin in opposite senses relative to one another.
The idea is that all the usual accompaniments (stress as well as strain: forces and
energies as well as distortion) match between d1 and d
′
1; and similarly between d2 and
d′2. So there is no need to imagine them away.
Nor is there any need for discs within one of the possible worlds to match in any
respect, except being perfectly circular, made of continuous homogeneous matter, lying
in the same spatial plane—and for (Same), spinning with the same sense.
Three comments, in descending order of importance, by way of clarifying this for-
mulation of the RDA:—
(i): Intuitively, (Different) describes equally well two distinct possibilities: one in
which d′1 spins in the same sense as both d1 and d2; and the other in which instead,
d′2 shares their common sense of rotation. This contrast of course depends on there
being a fiducial spatial direction in common between the possibilities. I agree that this
idea is perfectly coherent. But I emphasise that the direction needs to be specified by
something salient in the environment, such as a local gravitational field giving one an
up-down distinction, on pain of its being a distinction without a difference, i.e. a spuri-
ous distinction—an artefact of a diagram, or of our visual imagination. So: given such
a specification, (Different) indeed represents two possibilities. No matter: to challenge
the perdurantist, the RDA can simply consider either one of them.
(ii): (This follows on from (i).) The danger of making a distinction without a dif-
ference also crops up in another way. As mentioned in footnote 9, a formulation of the
RDA in terms of distinguishing two senses of rotation (and thereby keeping the usual
accompaniments) has been urged before, by Zimmerman ([1998], p. 268-9). But Zim-
merman’s brief discussion can be read as challenging the perdurantist to distinguish
between a disc rotating clockwise, alone in its possible world, and a duplicate disc ro-
tating counterclockwise at the same rate, alone in its world. And this formulation fails
for the reason emphasised in (i): the clockwise-counterclockwise distinction assumes a
fiducial spatial direction in common between the possibilities, which for these ‘lonely’
discs is a spurious distinction. (Callender ([2001], pp. 32, 36-7) seems to read, and
object to, Zimmerman in this way.) Our formulation above avoids this difficulty by
considering two discs in each possible world, so that we need only intra-world compar-
imagine away the usual accompaniments, had already been briefly advocated by Dean Zimmerman
([1998], p. 268-9), crediting an anonymous referee. But beware: Zimmerman’s discussion can be read
as placing each disc in a separate possible world—in which case it fails, as explained in (ii) below.
Zimmerman kindly points out (personal communication) that this was not his intention; so that his
formulation of the RDA is essentially the same as that invented by Mainwood and Wallace. For
novelty and precision, I present theirs. My thanks to them and Zimmerman.
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isons of the sense of rotation.
(iii): The possibilities can be modified in various ways. In particular, to secure
the needed intra-world comparisons of sense of rotation, we do not need two discs.
(Same) could instead contain just one disc, rotating in the same sense as a curved
arrow drawn on a sheet of paper lying beside it; (Different) would then similarly con-
tain a single disc rotating contrary to the sense of another curved arrow drawn on an
adjacent sheet of paper.
3.4 The RDA fails in general relativity
But in general relativity, the trajectory of a test-particle falling towards a massive body
depends on whether (and how) the body is rotating: the rotating mass ‘drags’, albeit
very slightly, the inertial frames in its vicinity (Misner et al. [1973] pp. 699, 879, 1117).
This frame-dragging means that the RDA fails in the sense that, in the usual version,
the inertial frames (the worldlines of test particles) are dragged around the rotating
disc (Rot), but not around (Stat); and in Section 3.3’s version, there cannot be the
perfect match in rotation’s accompaniments both between d1 and d
′
1 and between d2
and d′2, since the dragging of inertial frames around a rotating body is different, for
different senses of rotation. In short: the RDA fails because there is a dynamical effect
of rotation, to which a ‘sufficiently naturalist’ perdurantist can appeal so as to answer
the challenge of distinguishing the possibilities.9
Could the endurantist improve the thought-experiment so as to allow for frame-
dragging, in the kind of way that (Different) and (Same) improve on (Stat) and (Rot)
by allowing for the usual accompaniments of rotation? Perhaps, but I do not see how.
On the other hand, the endurantist has two lines of reply, even if she cannot thus
improve the thought-experiment. Both return us to some questions raised before.
First, she might emphasise that in developing the RDA for general relativity (in the
usual, or Section 3.3’s, version) she can stipulate that the discs are ‘lonely’, i.e. that
there are to be no test-particles travelling the dragged worldlines. Does this stipulation
make the difference to which the perdurantist appeals—viz. whether the frames are
dragged, and if so, how—counterfactual? The answer depends on the interpretation of
general relativity. Roughly speaking, a substantivalist will answer ‘No’, since they take
the metrical structure of spacetime to be real and occurrent: it is not just an encoding
of how suitable bodies would behave. But the endurantist may argue that she can ac-
cept general relativity, and so develop the RDA for it, without being a substantivalist
in this sense; (cf. Section 3.1). On the other hand, even if we accept that the difference
is counterfactual, perhaps the perdurantist can still appeal to it: (cf. Section 2.4).
The second reply is the obvious one about philosophical method. Surely no philo-
sophical account of persistence should be ‘so far gone’ in naturalism as to depend on
general relativity: it should be able to accommodate continuous matter in classical and
9This argument against the RDA, in its usual version, is due to Callender ([2001], p. 38); it is part
of his ‘No Difference’ reply.
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special relativistic spacetimes (cf. (2)(ii) in Section 2.3). And for these cases, the RDA
remains unrefuted, at least in Section 3.3’s improved version.
I think the second reply has force. But in the next two Sections, I will argue that
the perdurantist can meet the challenge of defeating the RDA even outside general
relativity: in short, by accepting only non-instantaneous temporal parts. Besides, this
version of perdurantism is supported by some heterodox proposals about the intrinsic-
extrinsic distinction among properties: proposals which are themselves supported by
some features of classical and quantum physics.
4 Perdurantism without tears: the classical case
4.1 Rejecting instantaneous temporal parts
In Section 2.2.2, I said I would take it that both average and instantaneous velocity
presuppose the notion of persistence, and are extrinsic properties; indeed positive ex-
trinsics, in Lewis’ terminology. But when we consider a non-instantaneous temporal
part, the extrinsicality needs to be clarified.
For one of the part’s constituent pieces of matter having a certain worldline segment
within the part is surely an intrinsic property of the part. And similarly for lesser, i.e.
logically weaker, information than the entire worldline segment. For example, that a
constituent piece of matter has a certain average velocity over a time-interval ‘within’
the temporal part is intrinsic to the part: notwithstanding the fact that average ve-
locity presupposes the notion of persistence. Similarly for instantaneous velocity at a
time ‘within’ the temporal part.10
This situation prompts some terminology; (in addition to Section 2.2.1’s point that
I can take ‘extrinsic’ to mean Lewis’ ‘positive extrinsic’, and so ‘intrinsic’ to mean ‘not
positive extrinsic’). Since from now on, I will be focussing on whether the possession
of a property P by an object o at a time implies propositions concerning contingent
matters of fact, especially about o, at other times, it will be convenient to use the
phrase ‘temporally intrinsic property’. By this I mean ‘intrinsic as regards time’: i.e.
roughly, a property whose possession by o at a time implies no contingent proposition
about matters of fact (especially about o) at other times (though it may imply propo-
sitions about other places). Similarly, I shall talk of temporally extrinsic properties;
and correspondingly, of spatially intrinsic and extrinsic properties.
Two warnings about this terminology. (1): I agree that my explanation is vague;
but it will be clear enough for this paper. This is in part because the underlying dis-
tinction between positive extrinsic properties and the rest is clear: unlike the general
intrinsic-extrinsic distinction, which remains unclear, indeed probably ambiguous—cf.
Humberstone [1996], Weatherson [2002]. (2): Note that a property could be tem-
10At least, these properties are intrinsic to the part, modulo the topic I set aside at the end of
Section 2.1, viz. how to justify the appeal to persisting spatial points, and a spatial metric, that is
needed for the idea of the distance traversed by the persisting object.
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porally extrinsic for one instance and not for another. Velocity itself provides an
example: it is temporally extrinsic for an object o at an instant t; but, as just em-
phasised, temporally intrinsic to a non-instantaneous temporal part (say, a stage of
just o’s ‘career’) that includes o at t. Humberstone ([1996], p. 206, 227) notes that a
similar phenomenon—extrinsic for one instance, but intrinsic for another—occurs for
extrinsicality and intrinsicality simpliciter.
These points are of course independent of whether matter is atomic or continuous.
The piece of matter can be a point-particle or a point-sized bit of matter in a continuum.
(Indeed, the qualification could be stated in the very same words for an extended piece
of matter, provided it was small enough for us to model it as point-like, i.e. having a
worldline, and a single velocity: but I can focus on unextended pieces of matter.)
To sum up: a non-instantaneous temporal part has a rich set of intrinsic, or at
least temporally intrinsic, properties concerning the worldline-segments and average
and instantaneous velocities, during the part, of its constituent pieces of matter.
Now consider a version of perdurantism that accepts only non-instantaneous tempo-
ral parts. (I will not discuss the pre-history of this proposal in authors like Whitehead:
for details cf. Grattan-Guinness ([2002]). But I will soon discuss whether it should
accept all such parts, i.e. parts with an arbitrarily short, though non-zero, temporal
extent.)
Since such parts have a rich set of intrinsic properties, the prospects for the per-
durantist project of defining persistence (or providing a supervenience-basis for it, or
at least some non-reductive account of it) look a great deal better than for a pointil-
liste version of perdurantism accepting only instantaneous parts (or accepting also
extended parts, yet requiring persistence to supervene on the intrinsic properties of
instantaneous parts, as in Lewis’ Humean supervenience). For with these rich sets of
properties, there are so many more ingredients which one could use in the definiens
of persistence (or more generally, in the account of persistence). More precisely: the
perdurantist’s prospects are a great deal better, provided their definition or account
of persistence can legitimately refer to these intrinsic properties of non-instantaneous
temporal parts.
In the rest of this paper, I will endorse this version of perdurantism, both in general
and as a reply to the RDA (both the usual formulation and Section 3.3’s stronger one).
I begin with the reply.
4.2 Replying to the RDA
The idea of the reply is as follows. The worldline segments, average velocities and
instantaneous velocities of point-sized bits of matter within a homogeneous disc provide
intrinsic properties of the disc’s temporal parts. Assuming for the moment that the
perdurantist can appeal to these intrinsic properties—an assumption I will discuss
in Section 4.3—she can certainly distinguish the discs. Indeed, with these intrinsic
properties to hand, she may well have no more of a problem about her project of
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defining persistence, for the parts of a perfectly circular homogeneous disc, than for
the parts of an inhomogeneous one. There are two aspects to this, which we can
call ‘kinematical’ and ‘dynamical’; (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). Then I will address an
objection (Section 4.2.3).
4.2.1 ‘Kinematics’
First, the perdurantist can appeal to the mathematical fact that every suitably smooth
vector field U defined on a open region R of spacetime has integral curves throughout
R: curves which are timelike, by definition, if U is timelike. (‘Suitably smooth’ requires
only that U be C1, i.e. the partial derivatives of its components exist and are continu-
ous.) So the idea is that the intrinsic properties of a non-instantaneous temporal part
of a classical continuous body (whether homogeneous or not) specify the vector field
U , of instantaneous velocities (to be precise: 4-velocities) of the body’s point-sized bits
of matter, on the spacetime region R of the part. U then specifies integral curves, i.e.
the worldlines within R of the bits of matter. Besides, by considering a set of such
non-instantaneous parts that ‘cover’ the entire period for which a given bit of matter
exists, its entire worldline can be reconstructed.
There are two points to make about this proposal; of which the second will lead us
to ‘dynamics’.
(1): Agreed, this proposal seems at first sight a cheat, a case of theft over honest
toil. But I am for the moment just assuming that the perdurantist can appeal to
intrinsic properties of non-instantaneous parts, even though some of them involve the
notion of persistence: postponing discussion to Section 4.3. And rest assured, I will
there admit that this assumption makes this kind of perdurantism ‘non-reductive’.
(2): The idea of reconstructing an object’s entire worldline by concatenating seg-
ments (each lying in one of a ‘covering’ set of non-instantaneous temporal parts) is
closely related to a formal equivalence between the ways that endurantism and perdu-
rantism describe the motions of both point-particles and continuous bodies (in both
non-relativistic and relativistic spacetimes). I develop this equivalence in my ([2004a],
Section 3). The idea, for the simplest case viz. point-particles or point-sized bits of
matter in a continuous body, is that:
(a): an endurantist will represent the motion by a single function q : t → q(t) ∈
M, mapping times at which the point-particle, or point-sized bit of matter in a con-
tinuous body, exists, to locations in a manifold M (either space or spacetime); while
(b): the perdurantist will use a collection of functions, labelled by time-intervals
that together cover the object’s lifetime; for example, if it exists throughout the closed
time-interval [a, b], there might be a function q[a,b] : t ∈ [a, b] → q[a,b](t) ∈M.
In this paper, I do not need more details of this equivalence (e.g. about extending
it to spatially extended objects). It suffices to say that one can reconstruct worldlines
from such functions, even for a point-sized bit of matter in an utterly homogeneous
continuum, provided the functions’ domains are non-degenerate time-intervals, i.e. not
singleton sets of times.
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This reconstruction of worldlines from a collection of functions raises two points.
First, I admit again that it seems at first sight a case of theft over honest toil: the per-
durantist reconstructs worldlines from functions that involve the notion of persistence.
Here I again refer to Section 4.3’s discussion.
Second, this reconstruction of worldlines is ‘kinematical’. It uses no information
about the properties of the moving matter, in particular the causes of its motion
(‘dynamics’): it simply invokes a set of functions that immediately specify worldline-
segments. So it is natural to ask whether our kind of perdurantist can give an account
of persistence that in some way appeals to (i) the properties of the moving matter, or
(ii) the causes of its motion.
The RDA argues that appealing to (i) cannot work for perfectly homogeneous mat-
ter, though (i) is of course the bread-and-butter of the philosophical search for criteria
of identity for actual objects of various sorts, such as persons. I believe that nothing in
our perdurantist’s rejection of instantaneous temporal parts undermines her appealing
to (i) for that kind of search; I will support this in Section 4.2.2 (cf. also Butterfield
[2004b], Section 6.2.2.(2)). On the other hand, (ii) leads to ‘dynamics’.11
4.2.2 ‘Dynamics’
Our perdurantist can indeed appeal to dynamics. That is: if she is sufficiently ‘natural-
ist’ that she is willing to appeal to the laws of motion (Section 2.3), then in a classical
mechanical world, the definition of persistence can ‘piggy-back’ on the determinism of
those laws.
That is: in common cases, the classical laws (above all, Newton’s second law, that
Force = mass × acceleration) fully determine the motion of a point-particle, or a point-
sized bit of matter in a continuum, over an interval of time [t1, t2], in terms of its initial
position and velocity at t1 and the regime of forces on it during [t1, t2]: all of which
the perdurantist can take to be given by intrinsic properties of a temporal part that
begins before t1 and ends after t2.
Agreed, that is rough speaking: hence my ‘in common cases’. For accuracy, I should
note some of the subtleties, in particular the threat to determinism from solutions in
which some quantities become infinite within a finite period of time after the initial
time t1. For point-particles, such solutions are known to exist even if we veto collisions;
for a popular account of this, cf. Diacu and Holmes ([1996], Chapter 3). For continua,
whether there are such solutions is a deep open question: witness the fact that one
of the Clay Institute’s million-dollar Millennium Prizes is for a proof or disproof of
the rigorous existence for all times of solutions of the equations that govern a classical
11This ‘kinematics-dynamics’ contrast exemplifies two more general contrasts in the philosophy of
identity (discussed in in my [2004a], Section 4.1) which I call (a) ‘ontic-epistemic’ and (b) ‘conceptual-
empirical’. (a) concerns whether the criterion or account of identity specifies the ‘constitutive facts’
of persistence, or our grounds—everyday or technical, occasional or systematic—for judgments of
persistence. (b) concerns whether the criterion or account eschews the concepts and results of empirical
theories, e.g. physical theories, or is willing to invoke them.
21
fluid, i.e. the Navier-Stokes equations.12
But for present purposes, I can discount these subtleties: here it is enough to suggest
that a naturalist perdurantist can go about defining persistence in terms of integrating
the equations of motion.
4.2.3 An ‘anti-pointilliste’ objection; and reply
You can object that the reply as so far developed fails, if the perdurantist accepts spa-
tially extended parts.13 That is: suppose the perdurantist accepts non-instantaneous
temporal parts that are spatially extended. She could accept these either (i) ‘right off’,
or (ii) as fusions of spatially extensionless (but temporally extended) temporal parts
(since most perdurantists accept unrestricted fusions of parts they accept). Then again
the RDA threatens.
Indeed, we can make the point without the complexities of rotation. Imagine a
homogeneous continuum of stationary matter, so that the worldlines of the point-sized
bits of matter are all vertical. Draw a congruence of timelike straight lines, all mutually
parallel, oblique to the given worldlines, say ‘going up towards the right’.
The objector of course agrees with me that no fusion of any set of non-instantaneous
segments of the given set of worldlines is a line in this congruence. That is, in different
words, the heart of my reply to the RDA as so far developed: (especially in (2) of
Section 4.2.1).
But, says the objector, consider one of the parallelograms formed by two parallel
worldlines, and two parallel lines of the oblique congruence. Our perdurantist should
surely accept as an object the matter in that parallelogram, either (i) ‘right off’, since it
is both spatially and temporally extended—and so surely kosher for an anti-pointilliste,
or (ii) as the fusion of the uncountably many vertical segments of worldlines it contains.
And now, says the objector, consider a collection of such parallelograms, all congru-
ent, laid out in a straight track, marching up towards the right: surely our perdurantist
should accept the fusion of this collection as an object. But this is a ‘rogue’ object.
That is, the perdurantist faces, as in the RDA, an embarras de richesse of persisting
objects.
In reply, the perdurantist could of course restrict mereological composition. But
this seems ad hoc: how to make the restriction so as to prohibit all ‘rogue fusions’?
I think a much better reply lies in naturalism about persistence; and in particular,
in the view (Section 2.2.2) that in classical mechanics, and classical physics, velocity
should not always be taken as just position’s time-derivative, and momentum as just
mass times velocity. There is ‘access’, both empirical and conceptual, to quantities
like velocity and momentum that does not go via position. Applying this view to
the objection’s straight track of parallelograms, marching up towards the right: our
12For a popular account, cf. Devlin ([2002], Chapter 4); for a monograph discussion of what is
known about the simpler case of a perfect fluid (Euler’s equations), cf. Section 4.4 and Example 5.5.8
of Abraham and Marsden ([1978])—thanks to Gordon Belot for this reference.
13Thanks to Frank Arntzenius, John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman for this objection.
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naturalist perdurantist just needs to:
(i): note that there is no momentum in the direction of the track;
(ii): have her account of persistence require that a persisting object have momentum
that is parallel to its worldline.
Two supplementary remarks about this reply.
(a): I am not committed to it being momentum, rather than some other quantity
such as energy, that is appealed to so as to prohibit the track. Also the perdurantist
will probably also need to appeal to various different quantities for various different
examples.
(b): I am of course not committed to the perdurantist denying that the track counts
as an object, in the wide ‘spacetime worm’ sense. It is important only that she deny
that it is a ordinary persisting object; for it is the business of an account of persistence
to distinguish such objects from the countless spacetime worms. (And in the wide,
spacetime worm sense of object, she would then allow that the track has a velocity in
the mere sense of time-derivative of position.)
So much by way of replying to the RDA. But I need to defend this version of
perdurantism, especially the assumption that the perdurantist’s account of persistence
can appeal to the non-instantaneous parts’ intrinsic properties. I will defend this
perdurantism in four stages. The first two stages are metaphysical; I expound them in
the next two Subsections. The third and fourth stages will return us to the philosophy
of physics. The third stage, in Section 4.5, concerns the classical mechanical description
of motion; the fourth stage, in Section 5, concerns quantum theory. The third and
fourth stages will each involve a novel proposal about the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction
among properties.
4.3 Intrinsic properties of non-instantaneous temporal parts
Intrinsic properties of non-instantaneous temporal parts raise three issues; which I
address in three Subsections.
4.3.1 Can the perdurantist appeal to them?
I claim that the perdurantist can legitimately appeal to these parts’ intrinsic properties,
even though some of them involve the notion of persistence. Does this mean that my
sort of perdurantist just gives up on the project of defining persistence (or at least
providing a supervenience basis for it) in terms that do not presuppose it? Agreed,
giving up need not spell defeat for perdurantism. For a non-reductive perdurantism of
the sort mentioned in (1) of Section 2.3 might have various merits—and merits that are
not undermined by accepting only non-instantaneous temporal parts. (I will support
this in Section 4.4.) But does my sort of perdurantist give up?
Yes and No! Yes, in that she aims to give some account of persistence, yet is
willing to have the account invoke notions that presuppose persistence; in particular,
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instantaneous velocity.
But also, No: for reasons hinted at in Section 4.2.2’s discussion of persistence ‘piggy-
backing’ on the laws of motion. That is: my sort of perdurantist need not assume
persistence as a primitive—or that persistence is somehow satisfactorily defined (or
accounted for, say with a supervenience thesis)—for some specific set of parts: say, a
set that covers the lifetime of the persisting object in question, or a set containing all
those temporal parts with a temporal extent (lifetime) less than some bound. She can
perfectly well pursue the project of defining, or accounting for, persistence as a relation
between any two non-instantaneous parts (including any two sub-parts of any given
non-instantaneous part).
And even if the perdurantist accepts all such parts, so that there are parts with
arbitrarily short, though non-zero, temporal extents, I maintain that this need not
involve a vicious regress of endlessly deferred definitions or accounts of persistence. For
the account may, for time-intervals less than some amount, become suitably ‘uniform’,
i.e. with no substantive variations for shorter times. In short: it can be ‘turtles all
the way down’, provided that below a certain level, the turtles are all the same. Of
course, this is in effect what happens in an account of persistence that piggy-backs
on the classical deterministic laws of motion, determining future and past positions in
terms of present position and instantaneous velocity (or momentum).
4.3.2 Temporal intrinsicality at an instant is rare
I turn to a general point about the sorts of property invoked in an account of per-
sistence: a point that applies to both endurantist and perdurantist, and to accounts
of criteria of identity for specific kinds of object, e.g. persons, where there are issues,
e.g. about the weighing of diverse factors such as bodily and psychological similarity,
absent from the highly general endurantism-perdurantism debate.
The point is simply that almost no properties are temporally intrinsic to their in-
stance at an instant. That is: almost all properties require features of their instance
not only at a single instant, but also at other (albeit perhaps close) times. So an ac-
count of persistence, or a criterion of identity for a specific kind of object, needs must
appeal to temporally extrinsic properties; (though the other times involved may be
close to the given one).
Unfortunately, this fact is obscured in most philosophical discussion of persistence
(at least in the tradition of conceptual analysis). This discussion focusses on the idea
of giving an account of, or criterion for, o at time t being the same persisting object
(maybe of a specific kind, e.g. person) as o′ at t′, that invokes everyday properties.
Almost always, the idea is that the object(s) (in perdurantist terms: the two temporal
parts) need to be:
(i) suitably similar as to these properties: where ‘suitably similar’ allows con-
siderable change provided there is some kind of chain of small changes; (cf. Follow in
Section 2.1); and-or
(ii) suitably causally related, with the properties being the causally relevant
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ones (in other jargon: part of the specification of the object’s causal state); where
again there can be a suitable chain of stages or states linked by causation.
So far, so good: I have no objection to searching for this sort of account or crite-
rion, nor to its invoking everyday properties in ways (i) and-or (ii). But the locution
‘at time t’, and the focus on everyday properties, makes philosophers often choose as
their examples observational properties, i.e. properties which can be ascribed ‘at a
glance’: be they ‘everyday-taxonomic’ like ‘is a rock/leaf/chair’ or ‘purely sensory’ like
‘is red/hot’. And since they can be ascribed at a glance, philosophers are tempted to
think they are temporally intrinsic in the strong sense of requiring something of their
instance only for a instant.14
And that is false. We are very gross creatures: our perceptual apparatus is in-
sensitive to such properties. Rather, the process of perception ‘averages’, in myriadly
complex (and often adaptive) ways, over the instant-by-instant properties of not only
the object but also the medium, and our perceptual apparatus itself. So any observa-
tional property is temporally extrinsic at an instant: it demands features of its instance
over a time-interval of at least about one twentieth of a second—and in general a very
complex, open-ended and vague array of features, to boot.
When we set aside conceptual analysis and everyday properties, and consider the
properties of technical science, in particular physical theories, the same conclusion
holds good: most properties are temporally extrinsic at an instant (though as empha-
sised, they may well be intrinsic to a non-instantaneous temporal part). Thus most
of the hundred-odd physical quantities that get an entry in a physics dictionary are
clearly temporally extrinsic at an instant. I have already mentioned velocity: obvi-
ously momentum, angular momentum and kinetic energy are temporally extrinsic for
the same reason. Many other quantities, such as temperature, conductivity (thermal
and electrical), permeability and permittivity, depend for their definition (as well as
their value) on collective phenomena that require a process or situation to last longer
than an instant (though perhaps much less than a second).
I admit that within classical physics, three familiar quantities are good candidates
for being temporally intrinsic even to an instant: viz. position, mass and electric
charge. Besides, for a point-particle: these also seem to be spatially intrinsic at a
spatial point, not just for an extended spatial region. At least, this is so modulo the
topic I set aside at the end of Section 2.1, about the basis of spatial geometry: that is
to say, a ‘relationist’ about spatial geometry would no doubt object to the claim that
the position of a point-particle is spatially intrinsic to a point.15
14All parties can agree that among non-observational everyday properties, most are temporally
extrinsic; indeed they often require features at other times of objects other than their instance: for
example, being married requires a spouse at a past wedding, and no intervening divorce or death.
15Beware! For a point-sized bit of matter in a continuum, the trio of position, mass-density and
charge-density seem to be not only temporally intrinsic, but also spatially intrinsic—provided we can
interpret the densities (i) as defining mass and charge through integration, rather than (ii) being
themselves defined from the masses and charges of finite volumes, by taking the limit of smaller
and smaller volumes. But in fact, we cannot interpret the densities like this: (i) fails, and we need
(ii)—another mark against pointillisme, in my view ([2005]).
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I also admit that this trio seeming to be intrinsic—taken together with the great
success of classical physics in reducing much of the behaviour of large complex objects
to the classical mechanics and electrodynamics of postulated tiny components, whether
point-particles or point-sized bits of matter in a continuum (‘micro-reductionism’)—
has undoubtedly been one strong reason, perhaps the main reason, for the prevalence
in philosophy of pointilliste doctrines like Lewis’ Humean supervenience.
Of course, the RDA is precisely an argument that such doctrines come to grief on the
topic of persistence.16 And my present point is that the rarity of temporal intrinsicality
at an instant supports my proposal to be perdurantist without being pointilliste—and
so to block the RDA.
4.3.3 A better reason for temporal intrinsicality
Finally, an incidental point. Philosophers discussing persistence have another reason
to focus on temporally intrinsic properties, in addition to the erroneous tendency to
think observational properties are temporally intrinsic to an instant. I admit that it is
a better reason. But it is a reason only for properties temporally intrinsic for shortish
intervals, up to about a second: not for the stronger notion of temporal intrinsicality at
an instant—which is the target of my anti-pointilliste campaign. In short, the reason is
that a property that is temporally intrinsic for a longish interval is liable to be useless
in a criterion of identity.
In detail: All parties (both endurantists and perdurantists) can agree that an ac-
count of persistence, or a criterion of identity, had better not invoke a property that
requires some feature of its instance within a period of time similar to the time-scale
over which the account or criterion is to be applied. For doing so is liable to make the
criterion hard or even impossible to apply. Thus suppose an account of the conditions
under which o at time t is the same persisting object (maybe of a specific kind, e.g.
person) as o′ at t′, invokes a property P : requiring, say, that o at t must be P and
so must o′ at t′. (The argument works equally well with other requirements, e.g. that
only one of the two need be P , but that change as regards P is suitably continuous,
with some kind of chain of small changes.) Then if being P at t requires a feature φ at
a time close to t′, it may well be hard to apply the account: having to ascertain that φ
holds close to t′ might entangle one in ascertaining whether the persistence claim for o
and o′ holds.
4.4 Non-instantaneous parts can do the jobs
I turn to the second stage of my defence of perdurantism without instantaneous tempo-
ral parts. I claim that, by and large, non-instantaneous temporal parts do the various
16Philosophers tend to forget that they also have trouble in physics. As mentioned in Section
2.2.2, the classical mechanics and electrodynamics of point-particles and continua have considerable
difficulties, some of which are aggravated by a pointilliste picture: cf. the previous footnote.
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jobs, within the endurantism-perdurantism debate, that the perdurantist demands of
temporal parts, just as well as instantaneous temporal parts. More precisely: this is
so once the perdurantist ‘just says No’ to the siren-calls of pointillisme. Of course,
I cannot here discuss all these jobs: I will make do with three comments. The first
comment is general, and will be illustrated by the second and third, which concern
particular jobs temporal parts are invoked to do.
4.4.1 Humean supervenience revisited
The first comment is an offer of a peace-pipe to the neo-Humean. She envisages the
world as ‘loose and separate’, a succession of ‘distinct existences’: ‘just one darned
thing after another’. My version of perdurantism can agree, in that it might well
accept all non-instantaneous temporal parts, no matter how short-lived: my veto is
only against utterly instantaneous parts.
Besides, my perdurantist can echo Lewis’ Humean supervenience, by making some
claim along the lines that all the facts supervene on the temporally local facts; i.e. the
facts specified by the intrinsic (if you like: temporally and spatially intrinsic) properties
of all the non-instantaneous temporal parts. To state this echo more precisely: she
can claim that for any covering of spacetime M by a family F of non-instantaneous
temporal parts (no matter how short-lived some or all of the parts may be), all the facts
supervene on the intrinsic properties of elements of F . (Here, ‘covering’ is understood
in mathematicians’ usual sense: a setM is covered by a family F of sets iffM⊆ ∪F ;
and similarly ifM and the elements of F are treated not as sets, but as say mereological
fusions.)
So the only aspect of Lewis’ Humean supervenience that my perdurantist needs to
deny is the pointilliste idea that all the facts supervene on the intrinsic properties of
spacetime points (or of spatially extended instants of time, i.e. spacelike surfaces). I
think neo-Humeans should find this a price worth paying: having all the facts supervene
on the intrinsic properties of all the non-instantaneous temporal parts should be enough
to satisfy a Humean’s ambition to have the ‘global’ supervene on the ‘local’.17
4.4.2 The problem of change
The second comment concerns the so-called ‘problem of change’. Perdurantists ar-
gue that o’s changing in respect of a property P is best understood in terms of one
temporal part having P and another having ¬P . In particular, they argue that the
endurantist has to understand P (and ¬P ) as a relation to a time, and that for the
17Agreed: since these parts in general overlap, the ‘fundamental description of the world’, given by
the infinite conjunction of all (the ascriptions of) the intrinsic properties of all such parts, is highly
redundant. But I say: no worries. After all, the exact spatial analogue occurs in continuum classical
mechanics. To describe a continuum, this theory needs—not the infinite point-by-point conjunction
of all the properties of points—but the highly redundant infinite region-by-region conjunction of all
properties of all regions; cf. footnotes 15 and 16.
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case of an intrinsic property P this is surely wrong. Hence the problem is also called
the ‘problem of temporary intrinsics’; (cf. e.g. Sider [2001] pp. 92-8, Lewis [2002]).
So far as I can tell, almost all the arguments for the perdurantist understanding
of change carry over, so as to support my version, i.e. perdurantism without in-
stantaneous temporal parts. (Admitted: as do almost all the arguments against the
perdurantist understanding of change.) The main reason is of course that if within a
single non-instantaneous part of o there is change in respect of P , the perdurantist will
understand the change in terms of one shorter-lived part of o having P , and another
not—and this need not involve a vicious regress (Section 4.3.1). Besides: since tempo-
ral intrinsicality at an instant is rare (Section 4.3.2), the perdurantist’s argument that
endurantism has trouble with temporary intrinsics is more persuasive as an argument
for non-instantaneous temporal parts.
But there is one objection; (my thanks to Oliver Pooley). Suppose that a tempo-
rary intrinsic property such as shape changes continuously over time, so that an object
o is square for merely an instant: to secure an instance of squareness simpliciter in this
scenario, the perdurantist surely needs an instantaneous temporal part.
Reply: Given the supposition, this is certainly right. Here I can only bite the bullet,
by any or all of:
(i) dropping the problem of change from the list of jobs my non-instantaneous
temporal parts are to do; or
(ii) urging that since temporal intrinsicality at an instant is rare (Section 4.3.2)
my temporal parts can solve the problem of change for the vast majority of temporary
intrinsic properties; and besides, urging that succeeding with this vast majority should
satisfy the neo-Humean (cf. the first comment above); or
(iii) adopting a ‘mixed’ view, more congenial to pointillisme, that admits in-
stantaneous parts as well as non-instantaneous ones, but then argues that it is le-
gitimate to account for persistence (and so answer the RDA) by invoking only the
non-instantaneous ones, as I have.
Of these options, I on the whole prefer reply (ii). But I will not in this paper try
to choose between these replies: in particular, I will not refer again to the mixed view,
though I agree it is tenable.
4.4.3 Puzzles of coincidence
Thirdly, the situation as regards the debate over ‘puzzles of coincidence’ is similar to
that for the problem of change. The puzzles (reviewed by Sider [2001], pp. 5-10, 141-
152) concern such cases as the statue and the clay, or the fission and fusion of objects
such as amoebae—or even persons. For example, after an artist makes on Tuesday a
statue out of a lump of clay, the statue and clay seem to be the very same object. But
they seem to differ in their temporally extrinsic properties (often in this debate called
‘historical properties’, e.g. by Sider [2001], pp. 5, 142): the statue but not the lump
was created on Tuesday, the lump but not the statue existed on Monday. Perdurantists
argue that these puzzles are best understood in terms of distinct objects sharing tem-
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poral parts, just as objects can share spatial parts (such as two roads having a stretch
in common).
Again: so far as I can tell, almost all the arguments for the perdurantist understand-
ing of these puzzles carry over, so as to support my perdurantism without instantaneous
temporal parts. (As do, I admit, the arguments against!). For example, almost all the
arguments in Sider’s critique of endurantist approaches ([2001], pp. 154-188), and in
his advocacy of perdurantism ([2001], pp. 152-3, pp. 188-208), carry over.
I said ‘almost all the arguments’ carry over. For there are two wrinkles. First, Poo-
ley puts the analogue of his objection in Section 4.4.2. Suppose that two objects fuse
for merely an instant: here the perdurantist surely needs an instantaneous temporal
part. I reply: I think this objection is weaker than its analogue in Section 4.4.2, be-
cause its supposition is more of an idealization, more a merely logical or metaphysical
possibility, rather than part of the content of classical mechanics. That is: classi-
cal mechanics does describe deformable objects changing shape continuously, as the
objection in Section 4.4.2 requires. But it does not describe instantaneous fusions.
Indeed, classical mechanics finds collisions, even of point-particles, problematic—let
alone fusions and fissions. (There is of course no problem about the spatial analogue
of instantaneous fusions, i.e. two 3-dimensional objects sharing a 2-dimensional part:
think of two semi-detached houses!)
The second wrinkle is that the issue whether to accept instantaneous temporal parts
does bear on one significant division within the perdurantist camp. This distinction
concerns how the perdurantist treats temporal language. The traditional perdurantist
view is that an object of ordinary ontology—i.e. a referent of an ordinary term, an
element of ordinary domains of quantification—is the whole four-dimensional object,
the maximal spacetime worm; (Sider calls this the ‘worm view’). But both Sider ([2001],
pp. 188-208) and Hawley ([2001], pp. 30-2, 41-64) defend the rival ‘stage view’, that
the referents of our ordinary terms are the temporal parts.
This is not the place to assess their arguments for this proposal. They concern, for
example, counting: the stage view says that at each time before an amoeba splits into
two, there is one amoeba (the stage), a verdict which matches everyday thought and
language; but since there are then two maximal spacetime worms, the worm view has
to say that there are stricto sensu two amoebae, and explain away everyday thought
and language by invoking some conventions about counting.18
For my purposes here, it suffices to comment on Sider’s position that the stages
he claims to be the referents of ordinary terms are indeed instantaneous—and so do
not persist: ‘no person lasts more than an instant’ ([2001], p. 193)! Sider of course
agrees that everyday thought and language take: (i) ordinary objects to persist, as in
‘Ted was once a boy’; and (ii) most of their properties to be temporally extrinsic at an
18For this line of argument, cf. Sider [2001], pp. 152-153, 188-193. But Sider has to admit that
sometimes we count by maximal spacetime worms, not by stages, as in ‘Fewer than two trillion people
have set foot in North America throughout history’. He writes ([2001], p. 197): ‘if ‘person’ refers to
person stages, this sentence will turn out false, since more than two trillion (indeed, infinitely many
if time is dense) person stages have set foot in North America throughout history’.
29
instant, as in ‘Ted believes perdurantism is true’ (Section 4.3.2). So he goes on to argue
that he can accommodate (i) and (ii) with a temporal analogue of Lewis’ counterpart
theory ([2001], pp. 111-3, 193-8).
My comment on Sider’s position is now obvious. While I admit that temporal
counterpart theory is coherent and powerful enough to cope with (i) and (ii)—the
stage view does not have to be so pointilliste as Sider! That is: one could combine my
perdurantism, the rejection of instantaneous temporal parts, with the stage view. Not
only do most arguments for a perdurantist understanding of the puzzles of coincidence
carry over and support my perdurantism (as I said above). Also, one could combine it
with some arguments specifically for the stage view: e.g. a version of my perdurantism
that denies overlapping parts could retain Sider’s counting argument for favouring the
stage view over the worm view ... But I leave developing this topic for another occasion.
This concludes my metaphysical defence of this version of perdurantism. I hope to
have made it plausible, quite apart from its blocking the RDA. But the philosophy of
physics has some more support to offer it. In the next Subsection, the support comes
from the classical description of motion. In Section 5, the support comes from quantum
theory. But this support is not ‘just technical’: each of them involves a novel proposal
about the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction among properties.
4.5 Instantaneous velocity is hardly extrinsic
Extrinsicality is usually discussed as an all-or-nothing affair. But it is natural to suggest
that it comes in degrees (e.g. Lewis [1983], p. 111); especially when one considers how
many properties are extrinsic—so large a class merits being sub-divided. Intuitively,
a property is more extrinsic, the more that its ascription implies about the world
beyond the property’s instance: (compare the philosophy of mind’s jargon of ‘wide’
and ‘narrow’ mental states—some are wider than others). That is rough speaking, not
least because of controversies about the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction. But I expect that
in many sufficiently limited contexts, the idea can be made precise in a natural way—at
least for the subclass we have concentrated on, the positive extrinsic properties. In any
case, I shall in this Subsection only consider the temporal extrinsicality at an instant
of the properties of position and its time-derivatives (velocity, acceleration etc.), in the
classical description of motion. This is certainly a sufficiently limited context for the
idea to be made precise. After making it precise, I will return to perdurantism without
tears, i.e. without instantaneous temporal parts.
In (1) and (2) below, I present two closely related ways of making it precise. On
both ways, instantaneous velocity is ‘hardly extrinsic’, i.e. hardly temporally extrinsic,
since its ascription to an object o at t implies ‘little’ about matters of fact at other
times. Both ways are based on the obvious point that the only ‘categorical’ propo-
sition that an ascription of a velocity (or indeed, of a higher derivative of position)
to o at t implies about other times is that the object o exists for some open interval
(a, b) containing t: all the other implications are hypothetical. This will support my
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perdurantism without instantaneous temporal parts.
(The difference between the two ways will be that according to the first, which is
‘read off’ the calculus, successively higher time-derivatives of position are more extrin-
sic; while on the second way, which is more logical and less mathematical, velocity
acceleration and all higher derivatives are equally—and only mildly—extrinsic.)
In what follows, we can think of o as a point-particle; but it could equally well
be a point-sized piece of matter in a continuum, or an extended body small and rigid
enough to be treated as a point-particle. It will also be clear that the temporal extrin-
sicality of average velocity, acceleration etc. is mild for essentially the same reasons
as for instantaneous velocity, acceleration etc. But to save space, I will focus on the
instantaneous quantities.
(1): The sequence of time-derivatives:— The discussion will be tidier if we consider
ascriptions, not of specific values of position, velocity, acceleration etc. to o at time
t, but of some or other value. Then successive ascriptions are of increasing logical
strength: having a velocity implies having a position, having an acceleration implies
having a velocity etc.
So consider a sequence of ascriptions to o at time t: viz.
(Pos): an ascription of a position, i.e. a proposition saying that o has some or
other position at t;
(Vel): an ascription of an (i.e. some or other) instantaneous velocity at t;
(Acc): an ascription of an instantaneous acceleration at t.
These ascriptions are of course the first three members of an infinite sequence of
ascriptions stating the existence of higher time-derivatives of o’s position. This gives an
obvious sense in which instantaneous velocity is only mildly extrinsic. Each ascription
is logically stronger than its predecessor; so (Vel), being almost at the start of the
sequence, implies little in comparison with later members.
In more detail: if a real function f has a derivative at a point t ∈ IR, it must
be defined on a neighbourhood of t and be continuous at t. So the existence of f ′(t)
requires the existence of f ′ in a neighbourhood of t and the continuity of f ′ at t; and
this in turn requires the continuity of f in that same neighbourhood of t. And so on.
In short: the existence of the nth derivative gives more information about times other
than t than does the existence of the (n− 1)th derivative.
(2): The ‘only categorical implication’:— But there is also another sense in which
velocity and the higher derivatives of position are only mildly temporally extrinsic.
This sense is more directly tied to the basic idea that the only categorical proposition
that an ascription of such a quantity to o at t implies about other times is that the o
exists for some open interval (a, b) containing t.
In more detail. Let us ask what exactly is implied about other times by the as-
criptions in the sequence; starting with (Pos). The metaphysical literature invariably
assumes position to be temporally intrinsic: why? The answer seems clear: ‘because
(Pos), or even an ascription of a specific value ‘o is at x at t’, implies nothing about
o’s position at other times’.19
19Once again, as mentioned at the end of Section 2.1: this answer ignores possible implications
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But to be more precise about ‘implying nothing’ (apart of course from necessary or
analytic propositions), we need:
(a) to decide whether to allow that the object o might exist only for an instant; (as
many metaphysical discussions of persistence do: true to the tradition of conceptual
analysis, they allow all metaphysical or logical possibilities, not just the nomic ones);
and
(b) to distinguish categorical from hypothetical propositions.
Although the categorical-hypothetical distinction is vague and contentious (because
‘logical form’ is), I will not need to be precise or partisan about this: for it will be
obvious from the calculus’ definition of a limit which propositions implied by ascriptions
such as (Pos)-(Acc) to count as hypothetical.
If we allow o to exist only for an instant (if we say ‘Yes’ in (a)), then indeed (Pos)
implies no categorical proposition about o’s positions at other times: there may be no
such positions! But consider a hypothetical proposition along the lines: ‘if o exists at
a later time t′, and some value (or upper limit) is assumed about its average speed
(defined in the usual way as distance traversed divided by time elapsed) over [t, t′],
then o is at t′ within a sphere of a certain radius, centred on x’. Such a hypothetical
proposition is of course not analytic; but it follows by just definitions and logic from
‘o is at x at t’.
When we turn to the next member of the sequence, (Vel), we of course get many
more implications. o must exist throughout some open interval, maybe tiny, around
t; and since differentiability implies continuity, o’s position at a time t′ in the interval
tends, as t′ tends to t, to o’s position x at t; and so on. But these implied propositions
are, with one exception, hypothetical. The hypothetical propositions include those
about average velocity discussed in the previous paragraph, and various others one can
spell out by applying the definitions of continuity and differentiability. The exception
is of course the categorical proposition that o exists throughout some open interval of
times around t; (and, to be precise: its analytic consequences, like o’s existing at some
time t′ not equal to t). In particular, (Vel) is compatible with o being anywhere at any
other time t′, no matter how close t′ is to t.20
Similarly again, for (Acc). There are again more implications, but they are almost
all complicated hypotheticals: the only categorical proposition about other times that
the ascription implies is the same one again: that o exists throughout some open
interval of times around t. And so on along the infinite sequence of ascriptions.
To sum up this discussion of (1) and (2): the temporal extrinsicality of velocity
and higher derivatives of position is mild. For almost all of the implied propositions
are hypothetical; and even the temporally intrinsic ascription (Pos) implies countless
such propositions. Besides, the categorical propositions implied by an ascription of
velocity, or of any higher derivative, are all just consequences of the one proposition
about other objects’ positions, at t or other times, and so sets aside the absolute-relational debate
about space.
20I here assume there is no limiting velocity, as in relativity.
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that o exists throughout some open interval of times around t. So as regards categorical
implications about other times, the temporal extrinsicality gets already at stage (Vel)
as ‘bad’ as it ever gets along the sequence: and that, I submit, hardly deserves the
name ‘bad’—it is mild.21
Finally, I can connect this discussion with the previous Subsections’ advocacy of a
perdurantism accepting only non-instantaneous temporal parts. The main idea here
has been that the ‘only proposition that goes beyond the instance’ implied by an
ascription of velocity (or of other derivatives of position) is that o exists throughout
some open interval, perhaps very short, around the time t. So the ‘only proposition
that goes beyond the instance’ that velocity (or other derivatives of position) implies,
corresponds to an intrinsic property of any (no matter how short!) non-instantaneous
temporal part containing t.
Obviously, this idea meshes with two points in previous Subsections:—
(a): A perdurantist who rejects instantaneous temporal parts can account for persis-
tence: either by fusing segments, perhaps arbitrarily short, of worldlines (‘kinematics’;
Section 4.2.1); or (more naturalistically) by ‘piggy-backing’ on solving the determinis-
tic classical laws of motion, given o’s initial position and velocity, and the forces on it;
(‘dynamics’; Section 4.2.2).
(b): A perdurantism without instantaneous temporal parts can accept all non-
instantaneous parts, no matter how small their temporal extent. Besides, if one accepts
all such parts one can add a claim that all facts supervene on the ‘temporally local’
facts, in a strong enough sense to satisfy all but the most pointilliste neo-Humeans; (cf.
Section 4.4.1).
5 Support from decoherence in quantum theory
5.1 Classical and quantum: relativizing the intrinsic-extrinsic
distinction
As I said in Section 2.3, I am not so far gone in naturalism as to just dismiss the
RDA on the grounds that matter is in fact atomic. I agree: a classical mechanical
continuum could exist—prompting the RDA, modulo the above replies. My argument
in this Section will instead be that the way in which classical mechanical objects (both
particles and continua) are in fact emergent from the quantum realm provides further
support for Section 4’s perdurantism without tears, i.e. without instantaneous temporal
parts.
21This view is reflected in the jargon of mathematics and physics. For example, mathematicians
call not only (Pos), but also the ascriptions (Vel) etc., ‘local’; and physicists call equations of motion
that determine the object’s motion at t in terms of its position and some of its derivatives then (but
without reference to facts a finite temporal interval from t) ‘local in time’. For more discussion, cf.
Arntzenius [2000] pp. 192-5, Smith [2003] and my [2004b] Section 4.2.2.
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This argument will use two new assumptions: one about philosophical method, the
other about the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction.
(1): I will now assume that the interpretation of classical mechanics—in particular,
our conception of how its objects (both particles and continua) persist—should be
sensitive to how classical mechanical objects in fact ‘emerge from the quantum’. I
agree that this assumption is controversial: why not just interpret each theory on its
own, as best you can? After all, there is no lack of work: as I remarked in Section 2.2.2,
classical mechanics is interpretatively subtle and problematic, even without considering
the dreaded quantum. But I am not alone in endorsing this assumption, even as regards
the interpretation of a classical theory being sensitive to an ‘adjacent’ quantum theory.
Thus for Belot ([1998], p. 550-4), it is the main moral of his examination of classical
electromagnetism and the Aharonov-Bohm effect.
(2): My second assumption is that it is legitimate to relativize the intrinsic-extrinsic
distinction among properties to a body of doctrine. The distinction is of course usually
discussed in terms of logical or metaphysical possibility: the literature discusses taking
a property P to be intrinsic iff it is logically or metaphysically possible for an object
o to have P ‘while lonely’, or ‘whatever the rest of the world is like’, or ... But I
now assume that it is legitimate to relativize the modality to a body of doctrine, such
as a scientific theory T . (I will not need the metaphysically more ambitious idea of
relativizing to the ‘laws of nature’, or to the laws of nature of some possible world.)
Therefore I shall talk, for any such body of doctrine or theory T , of nomic intrinsicality
and extrinsicality.
Unless T is logically or metaphysically necessary—a case I need not consider—the
relativized modality will be a restricted one. That is: not all logically or metaphysically
possible worlds make T true. In general, this will strengthen the notion of intrinsicality,
and correspondingly weaken the notion of extrinsicality—however exactly we under-
stand the original intrinsic-extrinsic distinction. That is: nomic intrinsicality will imply
intrinsicality simpliciter, and extrinsicality simpliciter will imply nomic extrinsicality.
For intrinsicality is a matter of ‘not implying propositions about the instance’s envi-
ronment’; and once we assume a theory T is true, any proposition in T can be an
implicit premise in an implication—yielding more implications. So in general, once we
assume T , more properties will be classified as extrinsic. So extrinsicality simpliciter
implies nomic extrinsicality; and vice versa for intrinsicality. (Similar remarks apply to
my notions of temporal, and spatial, intrinsicality and extrinsicality; and to the case
where we consider two theories T1 and T2, one implying the other.)
In fact, this idea of relativized intrinsicality has surfaced in the literature (Hum-
berstone [1996], p. 238); but so far as I know, it has not been pursued. I agree that
many a metaphysician will at first sight doubt its value, though they will probably
accept it as coherent. Thus Humberstone writes, after floating the idea of relativizing
intrinsicality to a class of possible worlds that match in their laws of nature: ‘From
a suitably elevated position [i.e. suitably general philosophical stance], this has an
element of arbitrariness about it: why not restrict attention to worlds—not with the
same laws as ours, but—with the same tourism statistics for Naples as ours?’ (ibid.).
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But I submit that relativization to (our best guess for) the laws of physics has some
interest! In any case, I can at least show that in the present context, it has the interest
of being surprising. For in Section 5.2 I will argue that the position, and even the
existence, at a time of an emergent classical object (whether a particle or a point-sized
piece of matter in a continuum) is extrinsic, relative to the laws of quantum theory.22
But before arguing for this, I should briefly set aside another way in which quantum
theory bears on persistence, and apparently on the RDA.
5.1.1 Unitarity: momentum as temporally intrinsic
Quantum theory violates an assumption that the RDA depends on, viz. that velocity
is not part of the instantaneous state of an object (in particular a point-sized piece of
matter). (I registered this assumption already in Section 2.2.2; and set aside Tooley’s
heterodox proposal that velocity should be thus viewed, on the grounds that veloc-
ity so construed presupposed persistence.) This assumption is often endorsed in the
metaphysical literature about space, time and motion, even apart from the RDA: for
example, Sider ([2001], p. 39) says ‘fixing the properties and relations of present objects
will not fix their velocities’ (cf. also his pp. 34-5).
The assumption tends to be associated with the fact that in classical mechanics, in
order to determine an object’s future (and past) motion, you need not only its present
position and the forces acting on it (in the time-interval concerned), but also its present
velocity; i.e. the fact that classical mechanics’ equations of motion are second-order
in time. For in a theory in which position and forces were enough to determine the
motion (a theory that is first-order in time), it would be more tempting to say that
velocity is part of the present instantaneous state. At least, it would be as tempting to
say this, as that the whole future (and past) history of the system is part of the present
instantaneous state (because of the determinism). Certainly, in such a theory the RDA
itself would have much less sting for a ‘naturalistic’ perdurantist, who is willing to let
her account of perdurance depend on the actual laws. For in such a case, ingredients
that the RDA’s advocate presumably agrees to be available to the perdurantist, viz.
position and forces, are enough to determine future positions.
But quantum theory violates this assumption.23 It is first-order in time. It combines
the position and velocity (better: momentum) aspects into a single instantaneous state
of a system which, together with the forces acting on the system, determines its future
(and past) states (setting aside controversy about whether there is a ‘collapse of the
22Besides, the extrinsicality has nothing to do with the possible involvement of other objects in
defining position, as urged by a relational conception of space: an issue I set aside at the end of
Section 2.1. The extrinsicality is what I have called temporal extrinsicality, rather than spatial; and
it arises from decoherence.
23As readers who are cognoscenti of quantum theory will have long ago noticed: at least by the
time that Section 4.2 proposed we could have perdurantism without tears, by letting the perdurantist
‘have’ velocity, and even have their account of persistence ‘piggy-back’ on integrating the classical
equations of motion. Apologies for the delay!
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wave-packet’ on measurement).24
So it is tempting to say that in quantum theory, velocity and momentum are just as
intrinsic (or temporally intrinsic) to the system at a time, as is position; (Arntzenius
([2003], p. 282) says this). A bit more precisely: once we are willing to relativize
the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction to a physical theory (as proposed in (2) above), it is
tempting to say this.
Furthermore, just as Section 4.2.2 proposed that in a classical setting, a perdu-
rantist accepting only non-instantaneous parts could have their account of persistence
‘piggy-back’ on integrating the classical equations of motion: so in quantum theory, the
perdurantist’s account of persistence could appeal to integrating the quantum equa-
tions of motion. (But as the weasel-word ‘system’ hints, it is controversial how to
relate persisting objects to quantum systems, even if you know the systems’ complete
histories: cf. the next Subsection).
So be it, say I. But again: I am not so far gone in naturalism about persistence—I
am loath to just dismiss the RDA on the grounds that quantum theory is first-order
in time. A theory of persistence should accommodate classical continua, and this
Subsection’s points do not bear directly on how it can do so. However, I will now
argue that quantum theory has other light to shed on our topic—once we ask the
interpretation of classical mechanics to take note of how classical mechanical objects
emerge through decoherence.
5.2 Position and existence as nomically extrinsic
So let us adopt the idea in (2) of Section 5.1, of nomic intrinsicality and extrinsicality.
The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction among properties is to be relativized to bodies of
doctrine—in particular, to quantum theory.
Warning: Choosing logically strong bodies of doctrine can yield odd-sounding ver-
dicts of extrinsicality. Given our interest in temporal extrinsicality, the obvious example
of this is provided by a deterministic theory. Thus suppose you choose to relativize,
not just to the deterministic theory itself, but to the conjunction of the theory and
the regime of forces imposed on a system in some time-interval (a, b). This yields the
verdict that every instantaneous state25 is temporally very extrinsic: indeed, about as
extrinsic as it could be. For given the laws of the theory and the forces imposed, any
instantaneous state of a system determines the system’s states during (a, b). But it
sounds wrong to say that every instantaneous state is temporally very extrinsic.
The solution of course is to exercise some judgment about what is a natural or
24Agreed, the Hamiltonian formulation of classical mechanics also combines position and momentum
in its conception of state, and so is first-order in time. But there is a crucial disanalogy: neither of
the pair, position and momentum, determines the other. (Indeed, the formulation is mathematically
equivalent to other formulations, under certain conditions.) But in quantum theory, the position and
momentum representations each determine the other.
25Since for some philosophers, a state is not a property, it is better to say: every property that
specifies such a state.
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useful body of doctrine to which to relativize. In our example, the theory is presum-
ably such a body of doctrine, but its conjunction with a specified regime of forces is
not: that is too particular (logically strong). More generally, we should allow some
distinction between ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ statements (or more generally; features)
of an ambient body of doctrine, and relativize the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction only
to (the conjunction of) the central ones. That is, only the central ones are held fixed
in all the nomic possibilities, and so by nomic intrinsicality and extrinsicality. Then
you may say in the example that (maybe part of) the specification of the forces is not
central, so that instantaneous states are not so very temporally extrinsic.
Let us now apply this sort of relativization to how classical mechanical objects
emerge through decoherence. Fortunately for us, although the quantum measurement
problem remains controversial and there remain many open technical questions in the
physics of decoherence, we need not address these controversies and questions. We
can sidestep the measurement problem, and manage with only the most basic and
best-established features of decoherence.26
Classical mechanical objects (both particles and continua) are in fact transient and
approximate patterns in the quantum state of an underlying quantum system. They
are patterns that emerge from an ubiquitous, continuous and very efficient process of
decoherence, which continues throughout the lifetime of the classical object. Roughly
speaking, decoherence is diffusion (spreading) in to the quantum system’s environment
of coherence, i.e. of the puzzling interference effects in the probability distributions
that are the system’s state.
To keep things simple, I shall discuss this in terms of the elementary quantum
theory of particles, not quantum field theory. But I should note that:
(i): quantum particles are themselves transient and approximate patterns in
the quantum state of an underlying quantum field or fields; for discussion of this, cf.
Wallace (2004, especially Section 5.2);
(ii): decoherence also happens within quantum field theory; for a review, cf.
Guilini et al. ([2003], Chapter 4).
Here are some details about a well-studied model of a quantum particle immersed
in an environment (called ‘quantum Brownian motion’). Take as the initial quantum
state of a tiny dust-particle (radius 10−3 cm) in air, a superposition of two positions
for the centre of mass of the particle, with the two positions just 10−4 cm apart (i.e.
a tenth of the particle’s radius), and with (say) the two positions not moving relative
to one another. The bombardment of the particle by air molecules is very efficient in
diffusing the coherence in to the environment: the superposition’s interference effects
converge to zero like exp(t/10−36 sec) and remain small for a very long time (1010
years)!
This means that very soon the probabilities for any quantity on the particle you
26Bacciagaluppi ([2003]) is an excellent introduction to decoherence for philosophers; for more tech-
nical details, Guilini et al. ([2003]), Schlosshauer ([2003]) are also excellent. By the way, all these
sources endorse the consensus that decoherence cannot by itself provide the solution of the measure-
ment problem, but is an important ingredient in any such solution.
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care to measure are as if there is an even chance of the (centre of mass of the) particle
being in the two positions; (i.e. probabilities for quantities other than position are
also given by a 50-50 mixture corresponding to the two positions). Similarly for other
initial states: if the initial superposition had the two positions separating from each
other at say x cm sec−1, then after a second, the probabilities would be as if there is an
even chance of the (centre of mass of the) particle being in two positions x + 10−4 cm
apart. Indeed, more generally: it is even possible to deduce the approximate validity
of the deterministic classical mechanical equations of motion of a dust-particle from
the underlying equations for the quantum system, together with a description of the
decoherence process.
So the classical object, ‘the dust-particle we see’, corresponds to one of these two
decohered possibilities (in my example: possibilities for the position of the centre of
mass). It is a pattern in a quantum state, which also contains another pattern corre-
sponding to the other possibility. If the quantum state were sufficiently different, not
only would the classical object not have the position and momentum we see: it would
not exist. In particular, if the decoherence process did not occur, it would never exist;
and if the decoherence process did not continue, it would cease to exist. That is: the
quantum system would continue to exist, but the classical dust-particle would not: it
would ‘disappear into a quantum fog’.27
I propose that we take these points, about how classical objects are in fact patterns
in a quantum state that are formed because of an ongoing process of decoherence,
as what I called ‘central’. After all, they are crucial to how such objects are in fact
constituted. That is: I propose they are to be held fixed in assessing whether a property
is nomically intrinsic or extrinsic. So they are to be available as implicit premises for
implications from ascriptions of a property to propositions about the world beyond the
property’s instance.
It follows that an ascription to a classical object such as a dust-particle, of a position
at t (to be precise: for its centre of mass, say), is nomically extrinsic. (I would say:
temporally extrinsic, since the implications are about facts at times other than t). For
the ascription (together with the implicit premises) implies the (categorical) proposition
that the object has a position at all other times in a (very short but non-zero!) interval
of times around t. Here, the length of the interval is determined by the decoherence
process’ time-scale.
Similarly, a statement that the object exists at a time is nomically extrinsic. For
it implies that the object exists at all other times in an interval about as long as the
decoherence time-scale.28
27For more discussion of the idea of classical objects as patterns in quantum objects, cf. Wallace
([2003]).
28A point of clarification for quantum aficionados. You might object that since
(i) the reduced state density matrix of the dust-particle (strictly: of its centre of mass degree of
freedom) is nearly diagonal (upto some desired level of approximation) in position, at an instant;
it surely follows that:
(ii) the position and existence of the classical particle is not nomically temporally extrinsic.
I reply: (i) is of course true, but does not imply (ii). For I am taking as ‘central’, not just the
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So far I have only discussed the emergence of a classical particle, such as a dust-
particle. But the discussion just given carries over to continua, as regards both physics
and philosophy.
Admittedly, there are more technical questions about decoherence in quantum flu-
ids that are still open than about quantum Brownian motion, which is by now very
well-studied. But there is already a good understanding of decoherence in quantum
fluids, and so of the emergence of classical continua. In short: recent work shows that
even in a quantum fluid, where there is no clear distinction between system and envi-
ronment, decoherence selects certain quantities (roughly, hydrodynamic variables) as
‘behaving classically’. Again, one can deduce the approximate validity of the classical
equations of motion for a fluid. (For details, cf. Halliwell ([1999]) and references given
there.)
As regards philosophy: I said above that the fact that classical mechanical objects
(both particles and continua) are in fact emergent from the quantum realm should be
reflected in the interpretation of classical mechanics, and so in a naturalistic theory of
persistence. One way to do this is now clear. Namely: take the nomic extrinsicality of
position at a time, and even existence at a time, as favouring the denial of instanta-
neous temporal parts. Thus decoherence supports the perdurantism without the tears
of pointillisme which I defended in Section 4: a naturalistic perdurantist can interpret
classical mechanics in terms of temporally extended temporal parts—and thereby block
the RDA.
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